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1. Foreword
To examine the issue of photographic representation through the 
Àlter of translation theory is an operation that may strike some as 
obvious, and others as contradictory or even inappropriate. It may 
indeed seem trivial, to include photographic imaging among the type of 
transformations wrought by translation, that is, to consider it among 
those transformations which set-up an equivalence between the source 
sign and the target one. Such an instance might more appropriately 
be called ‘transduction’; for it concerns only the expressive surface of 
the sign and not its content. Yet, every instance of translation, in the 
strictest sense, is based upon a verbal model of language. The act of
photographic shooting, whose very premise is visual and not verbal, 
Ànds itself in relation to the principal translation theories, therefore, 
oddly positioned. Regardless, however, it does not appear fundamentally 
questionable that the photographic image should be considered a sign 
in the fullest sense. Furthermore, notwithstanding translation studies’ 
customary one-sidedness in the matter, a wider focus on translation 
ought to include non-verbal languages, and may thus lead semiotic 
studies towards yet another turning point1.
This article’s point of departure is to be found in Umberto Eco’s 
Dire quasi la stessa cosa (2003) [partly translated as Experiences in 
Translation, 2001; and Mouse or Rat: Translation as Negotiation, 2003], 
particularly with respect to issues of literary translation, and in Nicola 
Dusi’s Il cinema come traduzione (2003) which applies the same conceptual
framework to cinema. The notion of ‘surrogate stimulus’ or substitute 
stimulus, developed by Eco himself in Trattato di semiotica generale [A 
Theory of Semiotics, 1976] and later revised in Kant e l’ornitorinco [Kant
and the Platypus, 1997], also deserves to be taken into account. This 
line of thought concludes that every operation of translation ought to 
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exist within the dual and opposite poles of equivalence and adequacy
regarding source and target texts. The Àrst refers to the ideal semantic 
identity between different languages’ expressions, while the second, 
having relinquished such an ideal equivalence, summons the narrow link 
between translation and interpretation as established by the semiotic 
theory of Charles S. Peirce. According to the latter the interpretation of 
any sign requires that it be translated into a different sign.
From a theoretical point of view, a photograph offers a good trial
for both criteria. With regards to equivalence, a photograph turns the 
“system” of light, colours and overall spatial array that physically make 
up a scene present in a scene into another “system” of lights, colours and 
lens-based perspective, one that is analogue but different from the Àrst 
(since it can now be “set” on Áat photographic paper). In reference to the 
second criterion, a photograph interprets reality through the subtraction
of meaningful elements, which occurs when a portion of reality is 
cropped, when a scene is compressed from three to two dimensions or
when a colourful view is turned into a monochrome image. 
2. Three Types of Translation
The starting point for any modern theory of translation is Roman 
Jakobson’s (1959) classic tripartition, according to which all possible 
modes of translation belong to one of three categories:
1) “Intralingual translation or rewording [which] is an interpretation 
of verbal signs by means of other signs of the same language” 
(Jakobson 1966: 57);
2) “Interlingual translation or translation proper [which] is an 
interpretation of verbal signs by means of some other language” 
(Ibid);
3) “Intersemiotic translation or transmutation [which] is an 
interpretation of verbal signs by means of non verbal sign systems” 
(Ibid).
While these definitions clearly demonstrate the limits of the 
linguistic model, especially when one is concerned with interpretation, 
they nonetheless reveal Jakobson’s interest for Peirce’s semiotics. 
However, for our purpose, a broader approach seems preferable, one 
where translation would be deÀned according to the similarity, or lack 
thereof, between different semiotic systems2, casting aside the privileged 
reference to the verbal model in order to widen the typology, and thus 
include visual and other non-verbal languages.
Indeed, it seems appealing to analyse photographs as resulting 
from a process of translation and transformation. This follows from
the assumption that reality possesses a semiotic structure prior to, 
and independently of, any photographic representation of it. Such a 
conception is consistent with both the structural and interpretative 
approaches to semiotics. Structuralists such as Louis Hjelmslev and 
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Algirdas J. Greimas have discussed the natural world’s macrosemiotics
in reference to reality’s inherent semiotic organization. On the other 
hand, though not diametrically opposed, one Ànds Peirce’s contention 
that the very Àrst perceptive contact with the world’s objects is steeped 
in semiosis. Indeed, according to Peirce perception itself fades into 
abduction. As a result it would seem that photography fully deserves 
recognition as a translational recording system for it applies its own 
semiotic structuring to a reality already organized in semiotic fashion. 
3. Translation and Interpretation From Peirce to Eco
In Peircean semiotics, the connection between translation and 
interpretation appears strong from the onset, outlined by the idea that 
a sign’s meaning may only be clariÀed by means of an interpretant, sign 
through which the Àrst one is translated (CP 4.127): sign and interpretant 
sign are thus, in some respect, equivalent in meaning. Also, it is relevant
to note that, according to the pragmatic maxim, semantic equivalence 
cannot be deÀned without considering the pragmatic effects of source 
and target expressions on their intended recipients: meanings may 
only be deemed equivalent if their pragmatic effects on interpreters are 
comparable. As stated by Eco:
To make clearer what he means, Peirce, in the same context, afÀrms that 
meaning, in its prime sense, is the ‘translation of a sign into another system 
of signs’. […] It is easy to understand that in this, as in other contexts, 
Peirce uses translation in a Àgurative sense: not as a metaphor but as a 
part for the whole (in the sense that holds translation to be a synecdoche 
of interpretation). (2000: 56)
Eco’s emphasizes the strength of the connection between translation 
and interpretation in Peirce’s theoretical model. But he also intends 
to warn us against assuming that each form of interpretation, or
each act of semiosis in general, represents an instance of translation 
without soliciting further explanation. The fact is that both Peirce’s and 
Jakobson’s (1966) main concern is above all semantic:
Jakobson was simply stating that the notion of interpretation as translation 
from sign to sign allows [one] to overcome the debate about the location of
meaning, whether it is in the mind or in behaviour, and he is not saying that 
interpreting and translating are always and ever the same operation, but 
that it is useful to consider meaning in terms of translation (or as I would 
say, as if it were an instance of translation) (Eco, Ibid).
I believe these comments may help shed some light on the semantics of 
translation and interpretation with regards to non-verbal visual meaning.
In fact, my goal is to apply to photography what Eco has developed in Dire 
quasi la stessa cosa (2003), factoring in the strong distinction he makes 
between literary translation per se and other kinds of transformation. 
Described as intersemiotic translation in the widest sense, the latter
would be more correctly referred to as “adaptation” or “transposition” 
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whenever a relevant change in content or medium takes place. For 
instance, transposition can include the adaptation of a novel or a play 
into a screenplay and into the resulting Àlm or television program. 
Transposition is a broad phenomena with which translation theory must 
wrestle even though it may be difÀcult to develop formal criteria that 
would ensure comparisons between source and target “texts”.
According to Eco’s framework, however, a distinction ought to 
be made between translation per se, and transposition. The former
involves verbal texts and is always a reversible process (i.e., one can 
theoretically translate a text back into its original language with some 
degree of success or accuracy), whereas the operation is impossible with 
transposition (i.e., it would be impossible to accurately reconstitute a 
novel from a Àlm adaptation of it). In the case of Àlms adapted from 
novels, one problem hindering backtracking to the source text is that 
movies often explicitly show what novels leave undetermined, thus 
specifying meanings that were left implicit. Novels, we all know, let 
readers use their imagination and personal experience to Àll gaps that 
Àlm adaptations must render concretely. Such transpositions require
that certain inferences be made manifest while simultaneously closing 
off others, thereby depriving the viewer of the initiative, the freedom or 
the pleasure to do so himself. According to Eco (2003: 315), a transposed 
text often says more and, occasionally, may say less than the original 
source. It never, however, respects the delicate balance between what is 
explicit and implicit, as should be the case for translation : “a translation 
should not say more than what is said by the original [text], it has to 
respect the source text’s [degree of implicitness]” (Eco 2003: 328).
Transformations, however, are not limited to media transpositions 
such as the Àlmic adaptation of novels. Indeed, any type of rewording 
(or “reworking”), even within the same semiotic system, can initiate 
content changes. When photographic imaging is considered to be an 
example of translation, a number of transformations must be considered:
photography imposes a speciÀc visual organization onto optical matter 
belonging equally to the naked eye’s Àeld of vision. A translational 
relationship connecting photography to “real” optical matter also exists 
between the photographic reproduction of an oil painting and its original
(see Eco 2003: 255): in such cases, only one relevant textual aspect 
needs to be accurately conveyed while all others (size, for instance) may 
be discarded as irrelevant. In translation therefore, the target text is 
generated according to the determination and organization of what is 
considered to be the source text’s relevant matter. Such a process implies 
accepting the losses due to different medias’ expressive capabilities and 
compensating for them with those provided by the target media, with 
the aim of best satisfying the addressee’s expectations. 
According to Eco’s analysis of interlinguistic translation, 
transformations of the above kind are ruled by two key principles: 
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1) the Áexibility of the relevant matter in the source text and its 
hierarchic organization in relation to the overall choices made 
during translation;
2) the loss of the semantic material (from the source text) not
conveyable in the target text and its compensation through the 
new expressive resources made available by the target media (or 
code).
These principles may be easily applied to photography provided that 
the aforementioned translational categories be generalized and extended. 
In order to adapt these concepts to photography, a reversal of Eco’s 
theoretical view becomes necessary, however. For instance, Eco imparts a 
peculiar relevance to certain Àgures of speech, like hypotyposis3 because 
they are linguistic devices that allow verbal language to substitute for a 
visual experience. According to the conceptual line herein adopted, the 
inverse must be considered: namely, it is important that the semiotic 
strategy allow the image to become (or be translated into) language. Not 
only can verbal language show while saying, but the image can also 
say while showing.
4. Iconic Signs and the Visual Stimulus’ Substitution
Allowing for verbal language to replace visual experience, even if
only in a limited and faulty manner, or inversely, allowing for an image 
to replace speech structures speciÀc to verbal language, if only in a very 
partial way, is a perspective that calls upon the fundamental notion of 
surrogate stimulus.
Developed by Eco (1976, 1997), on the margins of his radical critique 
of the iconicity as a nawve semiotic construct, this concept involves a 
careful reconsideration of the iconic sign. Peirce posits that an iconic 
sign shares similar properties, a likeness, with the real object to which it
refers. His classiÀcation, which divides signs (in relation to their dynamic 
object) into icons, indices and symbols, is based upon this degree of 
likeness, that is, the level of cooperation in the relationship between 
the sign and what it stands for. This level is maximal in the iconic sign,
intermediate in the indexical sign, minimal in the case of symbols. 
According to Eco, the solution to the problem of iconicity lies in 
the dissociation of likeness, a non-formal property, from the formal 
deÀnition of the sign’s structure. In A Theory of Semiotics (1976), he 
demonstrates how, according to a theory of codes, the condition of 
a sign’s production, but not its relationship with a portion of extra-
semiotic reality — whose situation is external to the semiotic system 
and contrasts with semiotic theory —, could be a relevant element for 
deÀning a sign’s inner structure. Furthermore, the opposition between 
arbitrariness and likeness is itself usually dependent on the properties 
of various other codes. As a result, their link with such notions, though 
widely accepted, is ambiguous from a theoretical point of view. A very 
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ancient traditional belief, which dates back to Plato’s Cratilus (see Eco:
1975: 254), associates arbitrariness with conventionality, in the sense 
that, when not ruled by necessity the production of a sign is instead 
ruled by a socially stipulated convention, and both properties come 
together as a discontinuous feature in the sign’s structure. In contrast, 
a motivated sign (such as smoke rising from a Àre) is deemed both 
natural and analyzable as a continuous phenomenon, that is to say, 
one inconceivable as a set of discrete units. Such contrasting properties 
may be sketched as follows.
NOMOS PHYSIS
  ARBITRARINESS   MOTIVATION
CONVENTIONALITY NATURALNESS
 DISCRETENESS           ANALOGUENESS
Figure A
Nevertheless, writes Eco: 
even a superÀcial glance at many sign phenomena tells us that the equation 
is not true and that therefore the oppositions are not synonymous; a 
photograph is perhaps ‘motivated’ (the traces on paper are produced by 
the disposition of the matter in the supposed referent) but it is digitally 
analyzable, as happens when it is printed through a raster (1976: 190). 
Hence, if a monochrome picture is not perceived as lacking something, 
even though it does not perfectly record the original chromatic values 
of the world, it is for the same reason that technical devices such as the 
artistic use of out-of-focus or blurred shots are conventionally accepted 
as possessing meaning nonetheless.
The key problem is that the Àrst opposition, between arbitrariness and 
motivation, is not fully congruent with the second one between conventionality 
and naturalness, neither opposition sharing the same scope of applicability.
Consequently, the relationship linking an iconic sign to the real object it stands 
for, may be both motivated and inÁuenced by cultural and social conventions, 
with the latter determining its potential for meaning:
To produce a signal that it may be correlated to a content is to produce a 
sign-function; the modes whereby either a word or an image are correlated 
with their respective contents are not the same. The problem is to Ànd out 
whether the former is a cultural correlation (and therefore a conventional
one) and the latter is not; or whether, on the contrary, both involve some 
sort of cultural correlation even though these correlations are operationally 
different (ratio facilis vs. ratio difÀcilis) (Eco, 1976: 191).
78013 001-254.pdf_out 9/15/10 3:34 PM K 34
Photography as Translation 35
In order to untangle this conceptual knot, Eco suggests that the iconic 
sign’s signifying capabilities do not reside in its sharing some property with 
the object it represents. Rather, they depend on transforming, within a 
given media (say photography), “the elements of a schematic conceptual or 
perceptual convention which has motivated the sign” (Eco, 1976: 194). Such 
signs offer “surrogate stimuli” (Ibid.) but only through the conventions proper 
to a given medium. In other words, the sign must evoke for its addressee a 
perceptual experience similar to the one produced by the corresponding real 
object to which it stands for, even though this experience (that of the sign) 
manifests itself through stimuli that are different in nature for those associated 
with the referent (or the experience one can have of it) and are determined 
by underlying cultural conventions. 
The recognition that cultural conventions play a role in “iconic” signs 
illustrates the fact that likeness alone cannot account for semiosis. Thus, 
for instance, aesthetic and cultural codes must be considered in picture-
taking. This entails bearing in mind spectators’ propensity for recognizing the 
portion of the world portrayed in a photograph, or selecting the right visual 
cues as relevant (and ignoring others), or the acquisition of appreciation 
habits imputable to cultures accustomed to making and sharing pictures 
and photographs. The capacity to distinguish various resemblances is a 
culturally acquired cognitive skill, which incorporates mental and pragmatic 
habits associated with the use of certain technical devices. Consequently, 
this likeness relationship, upon which photography is based, is neither 
instinctive nor, regardless of circumstance, consistently valid. A picture’s 
“likeness” therefore arises only under speciÀc conditions, many of which 
involve cultural mediation.
As Eco explains, the judgment of likeness is always pronounced on the 
basis of relevant criteria Àxed by way of cultural conventions:
The elements of motivation exist, but they can only work when they have 
been conventionally accepted and coded. […] A transformation does not 
suggest the idea of natural correspondence; it is rather the consequence 
of rules and artiÀce. [An] image is motivated by […] representation […] but 
it is nevertheless the effect of a cultural decision and as such requires a 
trained eye in order to be detected […]. Similitude is produced and must be 
learned” (Ibid.: 199-200).
5. The Trans-Mediality of Photography
Based on what was emphasized above and despite the years that have 
elapsed since it was Àrst coined4, the notion of surrogate stimulus is still
useful today when considering the problems raised by visual representation, 
including photography. For photography may be considered to be one of the 
most powerful and reÀned systems of visual surrogate stimulation. It is only 
surpassed by Àlm (and television), which adds movement and sound. 
It bears noting that motion picture recording is itself an illusion generated 
by a Áood of otherwise still frames projected at the appropriate speed. As 
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someone once said, cinema is photography twenty-four times per second. 
The increased capacity for surrogate stimulation in cinema results from the 
addition of motion, sounds and voices and its wider expressive potential. Yet, it
does not really compete with the one made available by still photography since 
motion and sound serve to enrich what is otherwise photography’s existing 
semantic potential. This is the consequence of the fact that the technical
devices used for shooting still or motion pictures belong to optics and are 
therefore governed by the same theoretical and physical principles, technical 
options and creative solutions regardless of the expressive domain to which 
they are applied. The title of ‘director of photography’ is bestowed upon the 
person in charge of the overall visual tone of a Àlm because ‘photography’ as a 
term applies not only the single frame imaging but to the medium’s technical 
and aesthetic options as a whole: from camera positions and movements, to 
the choice of lenses and lighting, the use of Àlters and other devices needed to 
achieve speciÀc visual results. These remarks simply underscore the central 
position of photography and its connections with the other components of 
Àlm production. A diagram such as the following one (Àg. B) might provide 
a better illustration of how these elements come together by highlighting 
qualitative, not quantitative, relationships. The image’s photographic structure 
is assigned to the diagram’s Àrst axis, the motion of both the camera and 
scene (pro-Àlmic motion) is on the second axis, leaving the third axis for the 
soundtrack. Therefore, the Àrst pair of axes deÀne the spatial plane upon 
which both the bi-dimensional frame and the three-dimensional scene rest;
the second pair of axes deÀne the temporal plane, containing the development 
of both the action and the soundtrack5.
Figure B
Once such general coordinates are established, it is nonetheless worth 
examining the theoretical consequences of medium’s accurate capacity 
for visual stimuli substitution, as well as the technical characteristics 
upon which they rely. The primary photographic properties, it now 
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appears relevant to emphasize, are the objective-looking characteristics 
of the image and the impression of reality they induces. Obviously, 
such complementary features are so tightly intertwined that it would be 
difÀcult to consider one without the other. The Àrst feature relies upon 
photography’s ability to translate the visual aspect of the portrayed 
real object into a picture through objective means of representation:
it is capable of conveying the impression of portraying reality without 
the intermediary of human subjectivity. The second feature consists 
in creating, for the spectators’ beneÀt, the illusion of being confronted 
with an accurately recorded portion of reality: a duplicate, or copy of 
reality itself.
The Àrst point addresses the fact that the presence of a human 
operator is hidden behind photography’s mechanical nature. Of course, 
the camera operator’s technical competency and aesthetic sensitivity, 
or, subjectivity, will inÁuence the image (depth, angle, lens, composition, 
framing, etc.). Hence, once set to function in a given fashion, the 
photographic device serves the conÁuence of the operator’s own visual 
intentionality by depicting as objective what is in fact the end result of 
a series of very subjective operations. As a result of its direct effect on 
spectators, who sees what the cameraman has Àrst seen for himself, 
it seems most relevant to consider the question from this angle. The 
peculiar relationship that exists between the camera operator and the 
mechanical device is then the seat of a process of delegated vision,
which is further magniÀed if one considers the production of moving 
images. In fact, in such instances, not only does the audience delegate 
its own vision to choices made by the cameraman during shooting, the 
Àlmmaker often delegates to the director of photography the task of 
deciding the overall visual tone of the work, while the latter delegates 
decisions concerning the Ànest details of a shot to the camera operator. 
In order to study photography from a translational perspective it becomes 
impossible to disregard the fundamental mechanism of the delegation 
of vision, which consists in what appears to be a cascading translation 
of visual intentionalities between the various actors involved.
The second prominent aspect, closely related to the one developed 
above, concerns the fact that photographic and cinematographic 
images imitate human vision in such an exact way that reality and its 
image might appear indistinguishable. It is what André Bazin (1973) 
called the “mummy complex”, in reference to Western society’s typical 
habit of rescuing real objects and bodies from the past by capturing 
them iconically so that the icon may come to stand for a long gone 
referent. Together, the image’s objective quality and the impression 
of reality emanating from photography accomplish, from a technical 
perspective, what man has long pursued through all other forms of
visual representation, beginning with painting: “photography does 
not create eternity, as art does, it embalms time, rescuing it from its 
proper corruption” (Bazin 1967: 14). Cinema, which inherits the same 
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photographic features, fulÀls this ontological” objectivity on the temporal 
plane6: as Bazin concludes “cinema is objectivity in time” (1973: 8). 
Concern for the “ontology” of cinema, as developed by Bazin and 
herein summarized, is not intended as a reference to an old-fashioned 
theory of cinema, but rather is meant to help us see how issues 
concerning the “true nature” of photography or cinema have once again 
become current, as a consequence of technological evolution. Nowadays, 
electronic processing techniques and digital photo retouching have had 
a profound impact over the documentary power of the photographic 
image and our understanding of it. So much so, in fact, that it has 
become possible to “photographically” show things that do not exist in 
reality or, inversely, hide away or erase what exists. The ever-increasing 
development and spread of such techniques challenge the distinction,
fundamental to photography and cinema theory, between Àlming and 
the Àlmed objects of the image. As a result, we ought to ask ourselves 
what is the “nature” of the “Àction” that is referred to by a photograph 
that has been digitally manipulated.
6. Digital Imaging as the Degree Zero of Translation
Digital photography offers a novel situation in which the CCD 
(charge-coupled device) sensor — a photoelectric device that reacts to 
light impulses by generating micro-electric current — constitutes the 
light sensitive element that replaces the chemical plate of traditional
photography. Once further ampliÀed via the digital camera’s other 
components, this electric signal is converted into information that can 
be stored numerically on a magnetic support as a Àle. Such aspects 
expose certain relevant differences between the digital process and 
the traditional chemical one. First, unlike traditional analogue photo 
processes, all phases of the digital process are completely reversible,
since once they have executed their tasks, the CCD sensor and the 
other magnetic devices are readily available for a subsequent “running” 
of the process. Second, information coded in a Àle format acquires the 
decisive feature of immateriality, rendering the particular properties of
the support upon which information is recorded insigniÀcant, as opposed 
to the Àlm negative whose properties of physical support cannot be 
separated from the information it stores.
From a translational perspective, digital picture processing acquires 
a particular relevance, related largely to the novelty it represents within 
photography. As previously mentioned, the choice between an analogue 
and a digital device has outlined wider implications than those pertaining 
to the strictly technical aspects above. Accordingly, any physical system 
that links the continuous variation of a Àrst variable to the continuous
variation of a second quantity dependant on the Àrst one can be 
called analogue; while, a physical system that relates the continuous
variation of a Àrst quantity to the discrete variation of a second one is 
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digital. In the case of photography, light values that belong to the real 
scene constitute the independent variable’s Àeld of variation, while the 
photosensitive material’s degree of response to incident light constitutes 
the dependent variable’s narrower Àeld of variation. It becomes clear 
that within a speciÀc range of value the photographic Àlm darkens to 
black continuously in proportion to the quantity of light to which it is 
exposed, while each picture element (pixel7) of a digital sensor reacts in 
a discontinuous manner, due to the binary nature of its value: from 0 
up to a certain threshold of sensitivity, and 1 once that threshold has 
been surpassed. 
Digital imaging therefore proves to be an issue of great interest from a 
translational perspective, as it includes a double order of transformations:
Àrst, the light signal that becomes an electric one; second, the digital 
sampling of the latter and its conversion via binary code. Nevertheless, 
both kinds of transformation may not be properly admitted into the 
Àeld of translation per se, since they are based upon one-to-one rigid 
correspondences between incoming and outgoing signals. These do not
allow for variation or interpretation, except for those occurring in the 
machine in a purely mechanical sense. It would therefore appear more 
suitable to consider digital imaging as the “degree zero” in the Àeld of 
translation through images: the digital processing of pictures would then 
be included among the processes of transduction8 rather than among 
those of translation proper. Among verbal languages, the transliteration 
process would represent a corresponding phenomenon, from the Latin 
to the Cyrillic alphabet for instance, or the transcription into Morse that 
allows a verbal message to be transferred over an electric channel. As a 
whole, these phenomena concern only the message’s secondary level of 
expression, the phonemes in verbal language and the picture elements 
in image language, which have no bearing upon of the content of the 
message. According to this view, the technical aspects of an image’s 
acquisition or elaboration are irrelevant and have no impact on its 
meaning: regardless of how the picture was shot and processed, be it
on Àlm or with a digital camera, through a darkroom or a “lightroom” 
process, the device’s technical features do not seem to inÁuence the 
content of the image.
7. Conclusions
We have demonstrated how the analysis of photographic imagery 
through the perspective of translation theory rests upon the premise that 
semiotic theory is based upon a semiotic organization intrinsic to the 
real world, called a natural world’s macrosemiotics. This notion, rooted 
in the structural approach to semiotics and developed by Hjelmselv 
and Greimas (see Dusi 2003: 3), merges with interpretative semiotics to 
include Umberto Eco’s revision of the iconic sign, whereby he excludes 
any extrasemiotic reference from the sign’s formal deÀnition. Subsequent 
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to this reconsideration of basic semiotic theory, the notion of surrogate 
stimulus was considered. In addition to its central role in solving the 
problem of the image’s meaning, this notion reveals itself surprisingly 
useful with regards to translation theory.
Once this conceptual framework was established, one provision 
allowed its application to photography: the generalization of Jakobson’s 
subdivision of translative moods. This move enabled us to include cases 
of translation that do not involve verbal language. Despite an obvious 
need for caution while the issue is further investigated, it appears 
possible to deÀne the limits within which it is appropriate to discuss 
photography from a translational perspective or, at least, the threshold 
over which an image loses relevance from such a perspective. In this 
sense, the superior threshold is represented by a change in expressive 
matter or media: if photography always operates transformations within 
the same visual or optical matter, it obviously cannot be considered a 
case of transposition or adaptation.
In the end, it seems that the application of translation theory to 
the pictorial domain may be valuable for both areas. On one hand, it 
enhances our semiotic understanding of photography, a medium that 
has long been deemed to be merely reality’s twin and hence lacking its 
own genuine semiotic nature. Thus, to afÀrm that faithful representation 
is a relative feature of photography and to replace it with the more 
suitable (though admittedly vague) notion of equivalence — by invoking 
the negotiated character of translation and its existence inside cultural
practices — means to Ànally reclaim possession of the photographic 
image’s full semiotic nature.
On the other hand, the comparison herein developed may end up 
proving even more valuable to the very idea of translation itself, at least in 
Peirce’s sense: as a form of interpretability. Whereas, as Peirce claimed, 
a sign interprets another sign by translating it and bringing meaning to 
it, it may be argued that photographic signiÀcation emerges from the 
substraction (rather than the addition) of elements. Indeed, whether 
it is achieved by framing or cropping, by compressing real 3-D depth 
onto a bi-dimensional surface, by transforming the chromatic range 
of the real world into the grayscale of a monochrome print, or even by 
giving up sharpness of vision for a blurred view, photography always 
interprets reality and turns it into an image by substracting something 
from it. This forces Peirce’s interpretation principle to widen its scope: 
the meaning of a sign can be interpreted by translating that sign into 
another one, causing either an increase or a decrease in meaning, that
is to say: a transformation.
Notes
1 Such a result stems from Umberto Eco (1976: 216): ”It is the very notion of
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sign which is untenable and which makes the derived notion of ‘iconic sign’ so 
puzzling.” This conclusion is probably too radical to be accepted nowadays, and 
too deeply inÁuenced by the intellectual climate of the time, one very close to the 
“textual turn” which completely upset semiotics, but it would be wise nonetheless 
not to underevaluate the questions it helped raise.
2 A typology of semiotic codes based upon their semantic potential was elaborated 
by Tullio De Mauro (1982), and its relevance has been already recognized for 
issues of translation theory (see also Gagliano 2000).
3 Hypotyposis is a Àgure of speech giving rise to a visual experience through the 
description of a scene, a listing of its relevant elements, or an accumulation of
events, features or characters. The most interesting case is when a hypotyposis 
calls forth the experience of something that the text’s addressee has never seen.
On this point see Eco (2003: 197). 
4 A circumstance shown by the fact that Eco (1997: 297) itself reworked the same 
notion, not only to justify the reasons leading to this debate in the 60s and 70s, 
but also in order to link the issue of the substitution of perceptual stimuli to the 
notion of cognitive type, later developed by him within the framework of cognitive 
semantics.
5 For simplicity’s sake, this diagram doesn’t take into consideration cinematic 
montage.
6 From this point of view, it is nonetheless worthy to take into account the 
peculiar connection that links photography to temporality and narration. At Àrst 
glance, while the click of the shutter sets the scene portrayed apart from the 
continuous Áow of actions, it isolates the purely spatial elements of the image, 
immortalizing their instantaneousness. As if the simple removal of passing time 
from the course of events was enough to deÀne the relationship between what 
happens and its image. If the lack of time-lapse over the text’s surface results in 
the loss of narration, a properly narrative dimension ought not be recognized for 
photography, since narration is precisely based upon a set of transformations 
that require the passage of time. But several famous shots, in particular those 
by Henri Cartier-Bresson (as well as his idea of “instant décisif”), might well 
convince us instead that in photography the passage of time is not absent as 
much as it is condensed or, better yet, crystallized in the image, a result achieved 
through temporal operations like the photosensitive material’s exposure to light, 
the lasting of the development and setting processes, not to mention the entirely 
subjective time of viewing the image.
7 Let us consider that, from a physical perspective, the single element, of which the 
digital sensor is made, is a photosite, that is, a microscopic photoelectric device 
that reacts to light by generating a micro-electric current. A picture element (a 
pixel) is the elementary part of an image, containing all the information about 
light and colour generated by that current. As a result one can say that a pixel 
is generated by the corresponding photosite on the sensor.
8 “The transducer is deÀned as a device or element that converts an incoming signal 
into an outgoing one with a different shape” (Mondadori 1980, XII: 350). “With 
the term ‘transduction’ what is intended is the transformation of a kind of energy 
into another. In the biological world some structures can resemble transductors, 
though with some approximation: these are receptors or specialized structures 
that place living beings into a relationship with the surrounding environment.” 
(Mondadori 1980, XII: 354). Thus, not only are the sensor of a digital camera 
or the diaphragm of a microphone transducers, but so are the eardrum or the 
retina of the eye. Finally, it is noteworthy that in Hjelmslev’s semiotics the term
‘transduction’ refers to transformations that involve different matters, substances 
and forms of expression (see Dusi 2003: 6).
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Abstract
The idea of envisaging photography through the concept of translation is based 
on the work of Umberto Eco on literary translation (2003) and its application to the 
cinema by Nicola Dusi (2003). In this article, the author seeks to clarify the terms and 
limits of this idea, all the while paying attention to debates surrounding the iconic 
sign and to issues raised by the coming of digital photography.
Résumé
C’est aux recherches d’ Umberto Eco (2003) sur la traduction littéraire, lesquelles 
ont inspiré le travail de Nicola Dusi sur le cinéma (2003) que l’on doit l’idée de 
s’intéresser à la photographie depuis la perspective de la traduction. Dans cet article,
l’auteur clariÀe les termes et limites qui rendent la chose possible et porte une attention 
particulière aux débats sémiotiques liés au signe iconique et aux questions entourant
la photographie numérique.
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